The unstable state of Iraqi politics has developed into an issue of international concern. Jamila El-Gizuli, a PhD candidate in comparative politics at the City University of New York, discusses diplomatic efforts to break the current political deadlock.
by Jamila El-Gizuli
Political squabbling by elected representatives has destroyed the hopes of countless Iraqis, but in quantifiable terms, the number of Iraqi civilian casualties during this power struggle has already exceeded 1,500. Five months into the inconclusive parliamentary elections, Iraqi political blocs are still at a gridlock, with no majority consensus emerging. The nomination of a Prime Minister is similarly stymied. Disappointed with the status quo, international, regional and national stakeholders have begun beseeching foreign players to step in. But is it the most prudent path toward resolution?
This summer, President Obama wrote a letter to Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani, Iraq’s top Shi’ite cleric, beseeching him to help his country’s politicians come to consensus. The ayatollah’s previous intercessions are recognized by Iraqi and American officials alike—particularly his role in defusing the Sadrist’s violent uprising against the U.S. forces in 2004. But appealing to a Shi’ite religious authority, albeit an Iraqi marjah [religious leader], in resolving a purely political problem involving both non-Shi’ite and secular elements, undermines this particular approach. Dr. Joseph Kechichian speculates that the marjah will remain aloof this time around just as he did during Bremer’s democratization efforts in 2004. As Al-Sistani's then said, "Mr. Bremer, you are American. I am Iranian. I suggest we leave it to Iraqis to devise their constitution.”
Numerous arguments have been made to underscore Al-Sistani’s politically shy personality as well as the low-key Shi'ite doctrine the ayatollah espouses, discouraging religious roles in politics. But taking these views at face-value is risky. Al-Sistani has made successful political demands for constitutional amendments and direct election of the provisional government. Additionally, Al-Sistani’s persistent indirect intervention may inadvertently flare-up dormant differences between religious sects. Recent reports circulating in Iraqi and the broader Arab media, while quoting anonymous sources, suggest that Moqtada Al-Sadr conveyed to Al-Sistani his support to Allawi, should the marjah back Al-Maliki’s bloc. Neither of them, however, has officially confirmed those reports.
While the United States sought intervention from the Shi'ite marjah, Iraqi politicians from major blocs engaged their Sunni neighbors, including Turkey. The diplomatic shuffle continues, beginning with Allawi’s visit to Ankara in May, Barzani’s trip in June and, most recently, Ali Al-Dabbagh of the State of Law Coalition and the current Iraqi government spokesperson and Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, the leader of the Islah Movement and a former prime minister. On their own initiative or by invitation, these officials and others are frequent visitors to Arabic capitals as well. It’s entirely possible to disavow the Sisyphean character of these visits while stressing the potential of regional mediation. But Iraq is not only multi-ethnic and multi-religious; it is also trans-sectarian. Therefore, its neighbors are on their toes for any future political arrangement that may have an impact across borders. Most important is the potential for a political resolution in Iraq that could empower ethnic or sectarian groups that are being suppressed within neighboring states. So long as Iraq's neighbors act rationally, they will not sacrifice their political interests for those of Iraq.
Nonetheless, diplomatic efforts are not confined to talks alone. In the past few weeks, American officials introduced a concrete scheme promising an equitable resolution of the current state of affairs between the major Iraqi blocs. According to the proposal, a power-sharing body, the Coordinating Council on National Strategic Policy (CCNSP), would substitute for the existing National Security Council. It’s expected that it would be led by Iyad Allawi, while Nouri Al-Maliki retains his premiership for the second term. However, it is unclear how this arrangement could be gratifying for Allawi, since the proposed Council is not intended to "change or disrupt the constitutional powers granted to the prime minister, the president or the speaker of the Parliament,” despite initial contention that its leader would serve as a new counterbalancing federal post to the prime minister. And although the devil is in the details, the proposed arrangement is, in its entirety, a precarious venture. First, it presents ad hoc measures as accepted procedures in resolving political deadlocks. Immobilization is a common recurrence in parliamentary systems. To allow contending parties to seek resolution through such channels undermines the role of the constitution as an impartial arbiter accepted and respected by all. Moreover, if ad hoc measures are deemed inevitable, as may be in the case in Iraq, where the new federal office aims at obtaining some of the constitutional powers granted to the prime minister to constrict any dictatorial ambitions the office may generate, the prudent approach must be applied. To devise these institutions and seek parliamentary approval to legislate them in the absence of a new national government is placing the cart before the horse.
Despite their differences in origin, attempts to bridge the gap between Iraqi political factions share two features. They originate abroad and offer sectarian solutions to political problems. The departure of American combat troops creates a turning point in Iraq’s history. At the same time, the fact that a secular political party achieved election success, even if wafer-thin, is crucial to guiding Iraq away from potential insurgent recidivism. Unless Iraqi politicians recognize the gravity of the situation and reconcile their differences for the greater good of the nation’s sovereignty, sectarian violence will shred the fabric of social cohesion Iraqis sought to weave in the recent parliamentary elections. This is not to ignore the influence Al-Sistani could provide in expediting talks, nor should we dismiss the negotiating capabilities of the United States and Iraq’s regional neighbors. Rather, it is essential to carefully draw the fine line that separates political mediation from political meddling. Meanwhile, Iraqis strive to survive increasing violence while living through scorching hot days with limited access to electricity and clean water. Even Ramadan did not seem to extinguish their frustration. On the contrary, it seemed to stoke it.
Jamila El-Gizuli is a PhD candidate in comparative politics at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York with a focus on the political development of Persian Gulf states and the governance systems of ethnically diverse nations, mainly Sudan and Iraq.
Image via Flickr, user Christine K.