By David Claridge
LONDON—On October 29, international authorities recovered two packages containing explosives and addressed to Chicago synagogues that had been dispatched from Yemen on cargo flights. Both packages were located and made safe by security officials in Dubai and Britain. Both of the devices were viable bombs.
Yemeni security officers arrested a woman who they believed sent the packages but she has subsequently been released. It now seems almost certain that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP] is responsible for the attempted attacks. The perpetrators of the incident are still at large.
The Routes
One of the bombs travelled on two separate Qatari Airways passenger flights: first from Sana’a to Doha, then on to Dubai. The bomb discovered at Dubai airport was concealed inside a Hewlett-Packard desktop printer. The printer was in a box with a textbook on management, a copy of a George Eliot novel, and various handicrafts, including a pink and purple-lidded basket.
The British authorities intercepted the second device at East Midlands airport near Nottingham. That package had been on a passenger flight from Yemen to Dubai before transferring to a UPS cargo flight to Cologne. The cargo transferred onward to Chicago after East Midlands. This device was concealed in a printer toner cartridge inside a similar or identical printer to the Dubai bomb.
The Bombs
The devices contained 300 to 400 grams of pentaerythritol tetranitrate, or PETN, a stable, odorless plastic high explosive, which is difficult to detect. PETN is more sensitive than many other comparable explosives, including TNT, but normally requires a primary explosive as a detonator. Its military application is often in detonator cords, primers, and demolition charges. In this case, lead azide was the detonating charge in both bombs.
The explosives were concealed inside the printers' cartridges, facilitating the concealment of a relatively large quantity of explosive, supported by sophisticated initiation architecture. The quantities of PETN in this case would have a broadly similar effect to five sticks of TNT; more than sufficient to cause a catastrophic explosion inside an aircraft and on a much larger scale than other recent aviation terrorism plots. It is estimated that around 50 grams of PETN would be enough to puncture a hole in an aircraft skin. Explosive experts believe that the devices are of the work of an accomplished bomb maker.
It appears that both bombs contained mobile phone parts, which are likely to have been used to initiate the devices. Reporting is unclear on whether the phone parts included SIM cards or the phones’ clocks were simply being used as timers. The balance of government and expert opinion seems to be that the devices were intended to be detonated remotely, perhaps by a call or text message from Yemen. Government statements on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed a belief that the aim of the plot was to detonate the devices while the aircraft were in flight.
The Intelligence
Security checks failed to detect either of the bombs. Under Annex 9 of the Chicago Convention governing international aviation, it is the responsibility of the originating state—in this case Yemen—to ensure the security of cargo. The state is required to take a risk-based approach. This discourages universal screening, although it is not clear whether any screening program has been set in place. The subsequent decision of several Western countries, including the United States, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, to close their doors to air freight originating in Yemen, reflects lack of faith in the screening processes that were applied.
Both devices were only discovered after specific intelligence warned of the threat of an Al Qaeda attack. The information reportedly originated with former senior AQAP member Jabr al-Faifi, who surrendered to the Saudi authorities two weeks ago. Saudi intelligence subsequently advised their British, American and UAE counterparts of the details of the plan.
Even with this intelligence, the British authorities struggled to find the bomb. According to some reports, an initial six-hour sweep of all cargo at the East Midlands airport failed to discover the device. Qatari Airways reported the bomb in Dubai had passed x-ray screening and trained sniffer dogs. What is clear is that had Saudi intelligence not received specific intelligence warning of an attack, the security authorities would not have intercepted the bombs.
Most Likely Scenario
Government statements suggest that the bombs were intended to detonate in mid-air. This reasoning is based in part on the address labeling of the packages, which suggest that there was no intention for them to reach their marked destinations. According to emerging media reports, the addresses for the Jewish organizations were out of date, and some details were replaced with the names of historical figures from the Crusades. If the bombs were intended to explode in mid-air, the questions becomes where, and to what end?
More likely, it would seem that the goal of the attack was to use the aircraft carrying the bombs as weapons against ground targets. Had the perpetrators wished simply to kill passengers, they could have detonated the bombs soon after take off. As far we can ascertain, there were no scheduled cargo flights out of Yemen even prior to this incident. This means that the terrorists would almost certainly have been aware that the packages would start their journey on passenger flights. The fact that the attacks were not initiated during this phase of the flights suggests that the intention was not to bring down a passenger airliner in the Gulf but to strike further afield.
AQAP’s failed attempt to down a long haul aircraft as it arrived in Detroit on Christmas Day last year resonates with this case. The group clearly had ambitions to use its base in Yemen to carry out attacks in the United States. Although the Christmas Day attack appeared to be an attempt to bring down an aircraft and killing the passengers on board, it appeared to be timed to cause maximum damage on the ground as well. This supports our analysis that the goal in this case may have been to cause explosions over President Obama's home city of Chicago, only days before congressional elections. Perhaps ominously, page 51 of the latest edition of AQAP’s English-language magazine Inspire shows a picture of the Chicago skyline. Al Qaeda affiliates have often used external communications to indicate intended targets.
We do not yet know how much control the perpetrators expected to have over the timing of the detonations, or how much knowledge they may have had of the exact location of their devices at any given time. They would have been able to track the packages’ approximate position on the carriers’ websites, but would be restricted to knowledge of the time and location of the last handling point. Using that information, it would be possible to extrapolate an approximate position of a package, but not enough to afford advance knowledge of route or precise location. American counterterrorism officials have emphasized this knowledge gap as a key question in the investigation. However, it is perfectly possible to track the exact location and status of any flight, including those operated by UPS and FedEx, using websites such as FlightAware. By combining information from both sources, we believe it would be possible to track a package with a fairly high degree of accuracy.
Recent reports attributed to anonymous American intelligence officials point out that a dry run had taken place in September, using similar packages without explosives. Although these packages were intercepted by federal authorities after they were linked to AQAP, their routings would no doubt have provided an opportunity to understand security measures and timing necessary to attempt the live attack. Based on the dry run data, AQAP may have felt sufficiently confident to use either a timer or a mobile phone as a command device.
New Tactic, Same Bomb Maker
While no group has yet claimed responsibility, AQAP’s involvement seems almost certain. The origination in Yemen, the use of PETN, similarities with the Christmas Day attack, and the source of the intelligence are the strongest possible indicators of a connection.
AQAP has become the most active operational franchise of Al Qaeda outside of Pakistan, having conducted a total of 51 attacks in Yemen. In recent months, AQAP communiqués and its quarterly online magazine, Inspire, have called for low-risk, low-cost and high-pay-off attacks against Western targets and into Saudi Arabia.
The group has developed a reputation for innovation. On August 28, 2009, the Saudi Deputy Minister of Interior, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, survived an AQAP assassination attempt by a suicide bomber with a device concealed in his underwear. The bomb was made from PETN. In the case of the Christmas Day plot, the same method of concealment was used to carry 80 grams of PETN aboard the transatlantic flight. The bomber carried a syringe with a chemical initiator designed to trigger the explosions.
American intelligence officials believe that Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri, a Saudi-born member of AQAP, was responsible for making both bombs, and is the likely author of the latest incident. He is described as a highly trained bomb maker and the brother of the suicide bomber who attempted to kill Prince Mohammed. He remains at large.
Cargo Security Failings
Recent events appear to demonstrate AQAP’s ability to identify and target security vulnerabilities. Having failed to execute an attack using a device carried by a passenger at the end of 2009, the group appears to have switched to a more exposed target.
Weaknesses in air freight security have been highlighted repeatedly by security experts and academics since 9/11 without achieving significant changes to international standards. The volume and scale of air cargo worldwide is so vast that there is significant resistance from carriers and end users to screening every package at an airport. By comparison, security checks for passenger aircraft and luggage are much stricter. There is no universal mechanism for screening freight cargo, with some countries relying purely on sniffer dogs. The fact that the packages were sent from Yemen to a Jewish organization indicates that very little scrutiny was given to individual packages.
A Continued Threat from Yemen
In the coming days, Western governments will enact further security measures in an attempt to contain the threat to aviation from Al Qaeda affiliates. But AQAP’s relatively unfettered existence in Yemen continues to pose an international threat. It seems that the group currently lacks the resources to maintain any significant tempo for international operations. It has carried out two attacks in 10 months, both of which are sophisticated and ambitious, but relatively small scale in their execution. We do not anticipate it rapidly developing capability to increase the frequency of attacks of this sort. But AQAP evidently does have the means to be creative and seek out weak links in security measures in pursuit of a spectacular attack. That is why its leader Nasirr al-Wuhaishi has been singled out by President Obama as “planning attacks against our homeland, our citizens and our friends and allies.”
The Yemeni government declared “open war” on AQAP on January 14 in an attempt to eradicate the group’s safe havens. The United States has provided substantial support through training, military equipment, and drone attacks. The counter-terrorism campaign continues. Most recently, Yemeni forces completed a military offensive in Shabwa province in the south of the country, but with limited success. The government suffers from a lack of support and influence outside of Sana'a, which makes counterinsurgency operations extremely challenging. Although AQAP has suffered casualties in the offensive, its core leadership remains intact and intent on conducting attacks against the West. AQAP enjoys protection from a small number of Yemeni tribes, especially in the south, providing it a safe haven from which it can plan attacks. Most sources suggest that the group retains a membership of approximately 200 people, many of whom are based in Abyan.
The Yemen-based radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki is of particular concern to counter-terrorism officials because he preaches in English and urges attacks in the West. Some credible reports suggest that al-Awlaki is responsible for an embryonic AQAP operational presence in Western countries. If these predictions become a reality, AQAP will no longer need to rely on long-range operations. While last minute Saudi intelligence disrupted the latest plot, and al-Awlaki is reportedly due to be detained by the Yemeni authorities, AQAP once again demonstrated its capability to design bombs capable of evading security measures. The group remains intent on conducting attacks, and is developing its presence. It will unquestionably continue to search for vulnerabilities in the security of Western targets.
Security Implications
Aviation security measures were circumvented by AQAP with alarming ease, highlighting the significant imbalances in their application and stringency from state-to-state, carrier-to-carrier and between passenger and cargo traffic. Yemen’s inability to provide effective domestic security appears to have introduced a critical vulnerability in an international supply chain. That door has been closed by the decision to disallow unaccompanied cargo from Yemen and Somalia, but the underlying inadequacies remain.
The most recent events come amid a debate initiated by the chairman of British Airways about the utility of current rigorous passenger-screening measures. He highlighted the tendency of Western security authorities to introduce reactive and piecemeal security measures, apply them unevenly and forget to stand them down when they become redundant. We expect to see more of that in the coming weeks and months, but this time in cargo security.
Fortunately, on this occasion, intelligence succeeded where security failed. That will not always be the case. It is certain that AQAP will continue to push at the door while it seeks to build capability inside Western nations. It is quite likely that the group’s innovations will eventually produce a successful large attack against a Western target. That is more likely to happen in the Gulf region than elsewhere, but the group's proven preoccupation with aviation, and its developing expertise in deploying concealed high explosives, suggests that its horizons remain firmly international.
David Claridge is the London-based managing director of Janusian Security Risk Management and United Nations Global Expert, a project of the UN Alliance of Civilizations.
Photo from Flickr via Kuba Bozanowski.