The ongoing crisis in Honduras, stemming from the June 28 coup that ousted President Manuel Zelaya, does not lend itself to many obvious solutions acceptable to both sides. A second-best solution may be all that the new mediator, former Nobel Peace Prize winner and Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, might be able to achieve.
Thursday’s separate meetings of Arias with Zelaya and then the de facto president, Roberto Micheletti, indicated possible common ground, but also no immediate solutions. Neither met his interlocutor, though the talks will continue.
Thus far, the United States has backed the Arias mediation, which has bought Washington time before it may have to cut its military assistance to Honduras, which U.S. law mandates once a democratic government has been removed extra-constitutionally. The history of U.S. military cooperation with the government and military of Honduras has remained extensive, since the 1980s, when Honduras hosted the U.S.-backed Contra rebels, who were attempting to undermine the Sandinista government in neighboring Nicaragua.
Not surprisingly, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appears to have persuaded Zelaya, after their Tuesday meeting in Washington, to negotiate, rather than rush right back to Honduras to attempt to take power. On Sunday, July 5, Zelaya had unsuccessfully attempted to land his airplane in the capital, Tegulcigalpa. The Honduran army, though, blocked the air strip, while also killing at least one protestor that had gathered in solidarity to receive Zelaya at the airport.
With elections scheduled for later this year, the simplest procedure might simply be to let the voters decide between the two presidential claimants. The problem here, though, is that the Honduran Supreme Court has already ruled that Zelaya is ineligible to compete under the existing, single term-limit system. Indeed, his desire to run again for office was exactly what spurred the apparent coup in the first place.
Supporters of the Micheletti regime maintain that to overturn the decisions of two government bodies (the Supreme Court ruled Zelaya’s re-election referendum was unconstitutional and the legislature claims to have impeached him) would amount to foreign intervention to undermine Honduran democracy. Micheletti might be best served to merely drag out the proceedings as long as possible. In office or not, Zelaya’s term expires in January 2010.
The negotiations should prove difficult indeed, given that each side maintains that the other violated the constitution. And neither side recognizes the legitimacy of the other. Thus, the crisis appears to be heading towards a zero-sum game, and Arias will have to be deft indeed. The Organization of American States (OAS), the United States, and the United Nations favor President Zelaya’s legitimacy, despite his alleged extra-constitutional violations. But the Micheletti government, thus far, shows no signs of backing down.
If the Arias mediation effort does not bring a solution, ultimately there are only several bad options: an armed invasion to reinstate Zelaya, sanctioned by the UN or the OAS; a prolonged exile of Zelaya, with Honduras becoming a pariah state receiving no foreign aid; or an attempted return of Zelaya on his own.
The first option is unlikely, and a large UN peacekeeping mission to suppress violence and support the reinstatement of Zelaya wouldn’t necessary support a democratic culture of government if the two sides cannot reconcile. Option two is even worse: a prolonged exile for Zelaya and resultant sanctions might only entrench the army and Micheletti regime, while spelling economic disaster for the innocent, and very poor, people of Honduras. The third option would likely immediately result in violence, which Arias certainly hopes to avoid.
Thus, the best scenario seems to be a stalemate, followed by a negotiated agreement to let Zelaya compete in elections in the fall, which would be monitored by the OAS and the UN. This would not be a constitutional solution, but neither would any other alternative. But the most pressing problem of all is that the future of democracy in Honduras, and perhaps the region, may be threatened by a protracted battle.
Let Hondurans decide the future of their country. The international community can assist by preparing both sides to compete in new elections later this year. The Micheletti government may claim that the constitution is on their side, but it has forfeited indispensible international support by expelling Zelaya from the country by force and then refusing him reentry.
Without much to stand on, Micheletti will likely hold fast to the old cliché that “possession is nine-tenths the law.” Zelaya, for his part, would be well-served to recall Rousseau’s adage: “patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet.”
Henry F. Chip Carey is associate professor of political science at Georgia State University. His forthcoming books are Dilemmas of NGO Peacebuilding (Palgrave Macmillan) and Repealing What You Sow: A Comparative Analysis of Torture Reform (Praeger).