Last January, I argued on the pages of World Policy Journal that the United States should end its war against the Taliban and focus on Al-Qaeda instead. The Obama administration should negotiate directly with the moderate factions of the Taliban movement, I said, offering them a gradual withdrawal of all foreign troops and greater political inclusion in exchange for the termination of all their ties to Al-Qaeda.
In March President Obama declared himself willing to negotiate with Taliban moderates, and since then, the notion that the Taliban do not pose a direct threat to the United States has slowly begun to sink in. Last week a senior White House official said that President Obama sees a role for the Taliban in Afghanistan’s future. Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban said in a statement that they have “no intention of harming other countries” and that they are fighting solely “for the independence of Afghanistan.”
Obama should continue this conversation because it could potentially split the Taliban movement along the lines of moderates and radicals. This would make it much easier for the United States to engage the former while isolating the latter.
A major impediment to dialogue is that many Afghans remain cynical and deeply conflicted about U.S. policy in the region. A political analyst from Kandahar (whose assessments are generally sound and often prescient) recently told me that he believes that the United States wants to establish a permanent military presence in Afghanistan to keep China out of Central Asia. He also reiterated the oft-repeated Pashtun complaint that the United States is propping up a puppet government made up of Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks to sideline the Pashtun people, ensuring that Afghanistan remains weak and divided. Obama must dispel these myths once and for all, and the best way to go about this delicate task would be for him to give a speech in Kandahar.
Just as he addressed the Muslim world from Cairo, Obama should reach out to the Pashtun nation from their historical and cultural capital. He needs to explain that the United States has no intention of occupying Afghanistan on a permanent basis or of dividing it along ethnic lines. At the same time, though, Obama should also note that the United States cannot leave Afghanistan until the Taliban stop supporting Al-Qaeda and decide to join the political process. Unless these conditions are met, a U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would only bring about the collapse of its weak central government, an escalation of the civil war, and the possible resurgence of Al-Qaeda in some eastern provinces. For obvious reasons, this is a reality that the world cannot accept.
Today, the war in Afghanistan is locked in a bloody stalemate. Whether the United States increases troop levels or not, the situation on the ground is unlikely to change. The U.S.- and NATO-led coalition is never going to defeat the Taliban militarily. The Taliban, meanwhile, stand no chance of overrunning any major city, let alone returning to power. The only way out of this impasse is for the United States and the Taliban to reach an agreement on how to build a stable and independent Afghanistan.
Obama should challenge the Taliban to follow through on their recent statement, letting them know that if they are serious about doing no harm to the West then they should publicly renounce their ties to Al-Qaeda and expel all foreign militants from the territories under their control. If these conditions are met, the United States could start scaling down its military presence in Afghanistan. The negotiations should go further, though, ensuring that the Taliban respect the rights of the Tajiks, the Hazaras, and the Uzbeks, as well as the rights of those Pashtuns who are not interested in following their strict interpretation of traditional religious law.
If the villagers of southern and eastern Afghanistan want Taliban rule, then so be it—but the residents of Kabul or Kandahar do not want Taliban rule. If left free to make their own choices, they would empower a moderate and dependable government. To encourage this kind of political shift, Obama needs to further distance himself from Hamid Karzai. It would make Karzai look less like an American lackey and Obama would gain credibility among Afghans for refusing to embrace the disgraceful electoral fraud that marred the August 20 presidential elections.
Federico Manfredi is a specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was an advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on policy in the Middle East and Central Asia.