Charles G. Cogan: Kind Hearts and Minarets

President Nicolas Sarkozy had some kind words to say about the Swiss the other day, in the wake of the surprising referendum banning the future construction of minarets in the Confederation. The French intellectual class, in the main, however, jumped all over him.

There are indeed some kind things to say about the Swiss. They are an example of an inter-cultural modus vivendi. Of the Confederation’s total population of 7.7 million, 72.5 percent are German speakers, 20.4 percent are French speakers, 6.5 percent speak Italian, and 0.5 percent are speakers of Romansh (an obscure Romance language). All four are recognized as national languages.

The Swiss gladly accept husbanding others’ money. They also husband their immaculate and picturesque farmlands. Their cities are clean, well ordered, and well policed. They also don’t like outside interference. They have a sturdy, almost totally conscript army to back this up. In the late Middle Ages, Swiss soldiers were considered among the best warriors in Europe. Perhaps this might have something to with the fact that Switzerland has not been in a state of war since 1815. Recently, the Swiss image has become tarnished, as the country’s position as a tax shelter for the super-rich has been criticized during the recent recession, and as the emergence of a far-right party has exposed a streak of intolerance in Swiss public opinion.

But back to the minarets, of which there are four currently in Switzerland, where the Muslim population is 400,000. By a strong majority (57.5 percent) in a November 29 referendum, the Swiss said there shall be no more.

What exactly did President Sarkozy say that caused such a typically French intellectual dither? First, that a referendum (“yes or no”) was not a good medium for such a complex subject. (The recourse to the referendum, however, is constitutionally mandated in the Swiss Confederation). Second, that rather than rail against the Swiss, one should look deeper into the motivation behind the rejection vote. Third, and most saliently, Sarkozy noted that while no one is seeking to discourage the free practice of religion, Muslims should be aware of Europe’s Christian heritage and France’s Republican traditions and therefore should not be overly provocative, choosing rather to practice their faith with “humble discretion.”

In evoking the notion of “Christian heritage,” Sarkozy reopened the old religious debate in France over laïcité, the French tradition of secularism that prohibits the intrusion of religion into the affairs of state—born out of antipathy to the French monarchy and its embedded clerical architecture. Though both are long gone, the question remains oft-debated: is laïcité religion-neutral or anti-religious? The latter interpretation, heard often from the left, is not shared by France’s president. “I don’t accept a sectarian concept of laïcité,” said Sarkozy in an interview published in the November 9 edition of Le Monde. “I don’t even accept the vision of an indifferent laïcité. I believe in the need of religion for the majority of women and men in our century.”

In some respects, this is not a suprising declaration: Sarkozy has recently launched a campaign to explore and restore France’s national identity in view of its having become weakened in the face of globalization. But there may also be a more tactical, cynical ploy behind his comments: France holds regional elections the coming spring.

Among his political opponents, the suspicion is that Sarkozy is choosing to open this debate—perceived by some as having an anti-immigration undertone—in order to shore up support among conservative voters who might be otherwise tempted to vote for the far-right National Front of Jean Marie Le Pen in the coming elections. But Sarkozy also has convictions, as evidenced in his book of conversations about religion (La République, les religions, l’espérance) published in 2004, well before he was elected president. For Sarkozy, the key word is espérance (“hope”). Here is a representative excerpt from the book: “The spiritual question is that of hope, the hope of having, after death, a perspective of accomplishment in eternity.”

So what to make of it all? Underneath Sarkozy’s irrepressible urge to “tell it like it is” in feisty and often over-the-top language lies a keen political instinct to the surprise of many and the chagrin of some. He appears to sense that a Europe of moribund Christanity and of living just for one’s enjoyment is weakening the fiber and coherence of society and, specifically in France, is chipping away at the Republican spirit of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Sarkozy’s efforts to shake up the pensée unique in France are commendable. An attitude that stemmed from France’s wounds in World War II and that exhibited itself in hypersensitivity toward any slighting of national sovereignty is now démodé. The French president has likewise departed from the reflexive attitude of disapproval toward the United States, NATO, and Israel. But in emphasizing France’s Christian roots (as he has done repeatedly), he is risking alienating those in France who are not Christian and those who are not believers.

Charles G. Cogan was a CIA operations officer from 1954 to 1991. His last overseas assignment was as CIA chief in Paris from 1984-1989. He is the author of French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing with ‘la Grande Nation (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003). He is currently an associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School. He is an officer in the Légion d’Honneur.

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