The following essay was originally published by Muftah, a web magazine focusing on the Middle East and North Africa.
By Nancy Elshami
“We won’t go, he must go,” chanted the hundreds of thousands of Egyptians demonstrating in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, following President Hosni Mubarak’s concession speech on February 1, 2011, the eighth day of popular protests against his rule. While the countrywide demonstrations calling for Mubarak’s removal hold serious implications for Egypt’s future, they also lay bare the ways in which Mubarak’s handling of these events likely spell the end of his regime. Though recent spikes in violence and chaos leave the course of Egypt’s current uprising unclear, the various moves made by Mubarak since protests began on January 25 have done much to fuel the protests. In particular, the government response to this mass mobilization tells an intriguing story about the interplay between the factors fomenting popular unrest, the challenges in ending uncontested authoritarian rule, and U.S. regional interests. Most tragically, however, these circumstances may bring a high death toll to the Egypt protests, with demonstrators emboldened by the government’s past tactics and the regime seemingly unwilling to unhand the reigns of power.
Fueling the Revolt: The Factors Propelling Egypt’s Protests
Aside from the economic, political, and social discontent that lay at the root of the Egypt demonstrations, there are several critical factors that have propelled and shaped the course of the uprising. As many have noted, the protests were largely inspired by events in Tunisia, which as Professor Fouad Ajami has observed, “shamed Egyptians into action.” Given Egypt’s historical place at the forefront of developments in the Arab world, many Egyptians strongly believed in their country’s primary role in paving the way towards a new Middle East. Beyond these initial sources for the Egyptian protests, certain government measures have further propelled demonstrations over the last several days.
The regime’s decision to cut off all internet services in the country, as well as mobile phone services for some periods, has been amongst these aggravating factors. The move has both infuriated Egyptians in the country and triggered uproar in the international community. This unprecedented transgression on personal freedom of expression undoubtedly propelled Egyptians onto the streets, who may have otherwise participated in the events from the comfort and safety of their own homes. While it remain unclear to what extent the internet and accompanying media blackout has served to push people onto the streets, that this measure failed to curb the protests demonstrates the movement’s attraction to more than a small intellectual ‘on-line’ faction of middle and upper middle class Egyptians. While this section of Egyptian society has undoubtedly played an important role throughout the past days, they are only part of the story. Independent labor unions have been pivotal in bringing workers onto the streets in the hundreds of thousands in the cities of Mahalla and Alexandria, not to mention the important organizing role played by opposition political parties of all inclinations, ranging from more established cohorts such as the Wafd Party to the more recently founded Kefaya and April 6 movements. The protests ability to encompass a wide swath of Egyptian society has undoubtedly increased its credibility amongst the population.
The government’s apparent attempt to cultivate an atmosphere of insecurity and violence in the country has, to a large extent, propelled continued support for the demonstrators. After the January 28 protests in Egypt, which constituted one of the most pivotal moments in this on-going affair, Mubarak, who had remained silent since the demonstrations began, made his first public speech to the Egyptian people, promising to dissolve his cabinet and appoint new ministers. The events that unfolded after the speech tell a grave story of apparent government-sponsored violence, aimed at dissuading protestors from pursuing their demands and casting a shadow of illegitimacy over the movement and its aims. State television coverage of ensuing protests, calling upon people to “preserve Egypt” and to stand against vigilantes seeking to destroy the country, reflected this strategy.
Shortly after Mubarak’s speech and under the pretext of the army’s deployment into Egyptian cities, the police made a full withdrawal from the streets. Due to the lack of adequate security, thousands of prisoners escaped from jails across Egypt, in massive and seemingly simultaneous prison breaks taking place largely within the ensuing twenty-four hours. Countless incidents of looting and violence swept the country, as citizens scrambled to form civilian committees and militias to prevent complete chaos and to protect their homes, families, and important cultural buildings like the Egyptian Museum and the Alexandria Library.
Anecdotal evidence points to government involvement in fomenting this disorder. As Reem Mansour, a 25-year old woman living in Alexandria, relayed to Muftah.org , “my husband and other men guarding the street caught two people trying to break into one of the houses. They restrained them and after demanding their IDs several times, they discovered that they were actually policemen in plain clothes. The two men told them that they were only ‘following orders.’” Several similar reports have been emerged, establishing that those creating this atmosphere of lawlessness are in large part drawn from the ranks of the Egyptian police forces, which have disappeared from the country’s streets.
Similar instances of violence cropped up following Mubarak’s second speech on February 1, when pro-Mubarak protestors attacked demonstrators in Cairo and Alexandria; until then, no pro-Mubarak protests had been noted by any of the media outlets covering the events. According to reports in Al Jazeera Arabic, the pro-Mubarak protestors were drawn from Mubarak’s political party, the National Democratic Party. This growing evidence of government-created insecurity parallels similar tactics used during the Egyptian ‘Bread Riots’ of 1977, when the government of then-President Anwar Sadat attempted to downplay the popular nature of the uprisings by dubbing the protests as “The Revolution of the Thieves.”
Despite the spike in violence that has occurred in the aftermath of Mubarak’s February 1 speech, the government’s strategy has done much to unite Egyptians together in common defense of their homes and their country. By forcing ordinary Egyptians into a policing role, the government exposes its agenda every time a plainclothes policeman is caught acting as a criminal. By connecting people from various walks of life in this way, the government may have done more to garner popular support for the demonstrations than anything else.
The government’s decision to make key concessions early on has further contributed to the protestors’ resilience. The first series of concessions came in Mubarak’s January 28 speech, in which the President attempted to quell demonstrations by vowing to appoint a new cabinet. The choice of Omar Suleiman, the head of Egyptian Intelligence, as Vice President was a shallow gesture, at best, towards change. Unlike Egypt’s previous rulers, Mubarak had resisted naming a Vice President, ever since taking power in 1981. Most recently, his regime had thrived on ambiguity concerning the fate of Egypt’s upcoming 2011 presidential elections, successfully depriving opposition forces of the opportunity to organize potential candidates. Omar Suleiman has been a key player in the Mubarak regime for a number of years, and represents a different variant on the status quo. As for the remainder of Mubarak’s new government, it constitutes a ministerial reshuffle at best, with only 14 out of 29 previous ministers sacked, among them the Minister of Defense, Finance, Trade, and Culture. Nonetheless, the reshuffle did bring one major change, by removing the many businessmen that served in the cabinet. Ministers who had entered politics after successful careers in business had come to dominate the Egyptian political scene throughout recent years. They reflected the marriage between government and business, which had begun with the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies that have thrust Egyptians into economic despair over the past several decades.
Mubarak’s latest concession, presented to the Egyptian people in his February 1 speech, came in the form of a promise not to stand in the Fall presidential elections and to work for reform during his remaining months in office. Demonstrators responded to these statements with disdain, with many rejecting Mubarak’s offer and demanding his immediate removal from office. As one demonstrator told a live broadcast of Al Jazeera English, Mubarak’s multiple concessions have signaled weakness and panic, and given protestors the confidence to demand the ultimate sacrifice, Mubarak’s immediate departure.
The role of the Egyptian military amidst all these developments has also been central to the demonstrations’ growth. The deployment of the military into the streets of Egypt on Friday, January 28th, was widely met with exuberance and support from the Egyptian people. Refusing to fire upon the protestors, the military’s non-violent attitude towards the people, in stark contrast to the actions of Egyptian police early on in the uprising, encouraged more people to join the protests and created an atmosphere of security in the immediate environment surrounding the demonstrations. One of the most trusted and well-respected arms of the Egyptian government, the army’s involvement in this uprising, however neutral, gave protestors the courage to continue coming into the streets in record numbers and reinforced confidence in the country’s ability to transition from a Mubarak government, under the army’s watchful eye.
Lest We Forget, It’s Not So Easy to Get Rid of a Dictator
But Mubarak does not seem inclined to go softly into the night. As recent developments suggest, Mubarak’s regime appears to have increased its efforts to create an atmosphere of violence and chaos within the country, in order to quell the protests, split the demonstrators, and fragment the opposition. As a result, an alternative narrative of the on-going events has begun to emerge, one in which stability is associated with Mubarak’s regime and insecurity connected with the anti-government protests.
The narrative received its strongest support so far, after clashes broke out during the day on February 2-3 between pro-Mubarak protestors and anti-government demonstrators, primarily in Tahrir Square. According to several reports, pro-Mubarak forces rode in on horses and camels, carrying swords, sticks, knives, and other weapons and began attacking the unarmed anti-government demonstrators, who since the start of the uprising have been prohibited by their compatriots from bringing weapons into the square.
The army, which has protected the entrances to Tahrir Square over the past few days, permitted the pro-Mubarak protestors to pass through. As the New York Times reports, “Many in the [pro-Mubarak] crowd said they had been offered 50 Egyptian pounds — less than $10 — and a meal to express support for the government in the square. “Fifty pounds for my country?” one woman said, in apparent disbelief.” Other reports have suggested that plainclothes policeman filled the ranks of Mubarak supporters. As the day progressed, the Mubarak-financed crowds have created an atmosphere of terror with weapons and Molotov cocktails, some of which were thrown at the Egyptian National Museum, but the majority used to scatter protestors. Rather than publicly seeking to end the crisis, the military which had until this point remained ambiguously neutral, has begun to appear more inclined towards preventing demonstrations from continuing. Earlier in the day, the army issued a statement calling on anti-government protestors to remain in their homes. When clashes broke out later, the army largely stood by as armed regime supporters attacked peaceful gatherings in Tahrir Square. Similar reports have emerged from Alexandria, Suez, and other major Egyptian cities.
Should the violence and general uncertainty continue to increase, support for Mubarak is likely rise. Similarly, Mubarak’s decision to stand down from the upcoming presidential elections may work to split the demonstrators. Satisfied with these concessions, some members of the pro-Mubarak protests may have genuinely turned against those seeking to continue the demonstrations to push for Mubarak’s immediate departure. As curfews continue and businesses remain closed, the impulse to accept Mubarak’s promise to leave office at the end of his term may become more attractive. At the same time, however, having been emboldened by their success so far, many protestors may refuse to be cowed by the increasing violence and chaos, and decide stand their ground on Egypt’s streets. This combination may be a recipe for disaster, with the potential to result in a steep loss in life amongst demonstrators.
The U.S. Response
As long as the United States continues to support the Egyptian government, however dwindling it may be, and the military remains ostensibly “neutral”, time is certainly on the regime’s side. So far, the United States’ response to the uprising, while supportive of demonstrators’ “rights”, has turned a blind eye to the regime’s transgressions against the peaceful protestors. In several official statements, U.S. officials have unfairly placed equal responsibility upon both the protestors and the government to maintain peace. The United States’ hesitance to abandon Mubarak is unsurprising, given its thirty-years of support for his regime and the over $1 billion dollars of aid spent annually to maintain the Egyptian status quo. As the protests have continued to grow in size and scope, the Obama administration has found it increasingly difficult to support Mubarak’s continued rule. According to reports, U.S. officials spoke to Mubarak, shortly before the latter’s February 1 speech, and encouraged him to announce his decision not to run for re-election. In his own speech after Mubarak’s announcement, Obama noted that it was a “moment of transformation” and demanded that “an orderly transition must be meaningful, must be peaceful, and it must begin now”. But when and how Mubarak will step down remains an open question for the U.S. Administration, which has been caught off guard by the protests in general and by demonstrators’ refusal to accept Mubarak’s latest concession in particular. The longer the United States waivers on this point, the greater chances Mubarak has of weathering this storm.
Conclusion
Speculations remain rife on the future of Egypt’s unprecedented uprising. Nonetheless, a few observations can be made at this point. First, the relative speed with which protestors were able to force the government into making substantial concessions attests to the magnitude of the uprising. Second, politically speaking, Mubarak is dead in the water. After the events of the last week, there is little that can be done to reestablish Mubarak’s legitimacy as ruler of Egypt. Admittedly, the regime’s tactics of violence and coercion has demonstrated some success in creating an atmosphere of chaos and splitting the Egyptian people. However, the transparency of these government strategies has underscored the Egyptian government’s treachery and stands a strong chance of further adding to the scope and depth of these protests, as people become further disillusioned with their ageing ruler. Nonetheless, with violence increasing and protestors growing more defiant, the number of dead or injured demonstrators will likely steeply increase, a circumstance directly resulting from the government’s strategy over the last week. Finally, the United States’ key role in the regime’s future may work against the interest of demonstrators, should the U.S. government chose to remove pressure from Mubarak or otherwise decide to throw its support behind its old friend.
In the coming days and weeks, answers to many of the questions raised by recent events in Egypt will hopefully be found. Will Mubarak’s carrot and stick strategy prevail? Will the regime succeed in creating schisms among the people great enough to undermine the protests? Will the international community stand by as Mubarak implements a brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators? If Mubarak remains in power, what will the next six months look like for Egypt and what role will opposition political parties play in ensuring a democratic transition? If Mubarak is forced from power, what role will the United States play in ensuring that the new government will continue to protect its regional interests? The answers to these questions will make clear the future that lies in store for ordinary Egyptian citizens, who have finally stood up in large numbers to demand their daily bread and human dignity.
Nancy Elshami is a staff writer at Muftah.
[Image courtesy of Al Jazeera English.]